Agentic Security — when an AI system can act, a bad output becomes a real event.
An autonomous agent that can query a database, send an email or call another system doesn't just risk a wrong answer — it risks a wrong action. SIRI's agentic security capability tests what happens when an AI agent is manipulated into doing something it shouldn't.
An agent doesn't just answer — it acts
The failure mode of a manipulated chatbot is a bad sentence. The failure mode of a manipulated agent is a bad action.
Agentic AI systems are built to take initiative — querying data, calling APIs, sending communications, orchestrating other systems — with limited human review of each individual step. That's precisely what makes them useful, and precisely what makes a successful manipulation dangerous: the attacker doesn't need to extract information directly, they just need to convince the agent to act on their behalf.
Traditional application security assumes a human reviews consequential actions before they happen. Agentic systems are explicitly designed to reduce that review — that's the automation value. Testing an agent means testing whether it can be manipulated, through its inputs, its retrieved context, or the content it processes, into taking an action outside its intended scope: exfiltrating data through a tool call, escalating its own permissions, or chaining several small actions into a larger unintended outcome.
SIRI's agentic security testing maps every tool, plugin and action an agent can take, then tests whether it can be manipulated into using them outside intended scope — through direct instructions, indirect prompt injection via retrieved content, or multi-step chaining — and reports findings mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10, alongside the same infrastructure testing SIRI Attack applies to everything else in your environment.
What organisations get wrong
Four assumptions that leave agentic risk untested
Most agentic security gaps come from treating an agent like a chatbot with extra features.
“We tested the model, so the agent is covered”
Model-level testing doesn't cover the tools, plugins and permissions layered on top — that's where agentic-specific risk actually lives.
“The agent only acts on our instructions”
Indirect prompt injection through retrieved content, documents or tool outputs can influence an agent's behaviour without ever touching the original instructions.
“We gave it broad access to be useful”
Excessive agency — permissions broader than a task actually requires — is precisely the condition that turns a successful manipulation into a serious incident.
“Each action is small, so the risk is small”
Multi-step agents can chain individually low-risk actions into a materially larger outcome — testing needs to cover sequences, not just single actions in isolation.
What SIRI's agentic security covers
Testing what an agent can be manipulated into doing
Every tool, plugin and action mapped and tested — mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10.
Excessive-Agency Assessment
Testing whether an agent's permissions exceed what its task actually requires.
- Permission & scope review
- Least-privilege gap analysis
- OWASP LLM06 mapping
Tool & Plugin Security
Assessing every tool and plugin an agent can call for misuse potential.
- Tool-call permission testing
- Plugin-boundary testing
- API-call abuse testing
Indirect Prompt Injection
Testing manipulation through retrieved content, documents and tool outputs, not just direct prompts.
- Indirect injection testing
- Poisoned-content testing
- Cross-context contamination
Multi-Step Action Testing
Testing whether individually small actions can be chained into a larger unintended outcome.
- Action-sequence testing
- Compounding-risk analysis
- Workflow orchestration testing
Guardrail & Policy Design
Designing constraints that hold up under adversarial pressure, not just normal use.
- Guardrail design & review
- Human-in-the-loop checkpoints
- Fail-safe design
Agentic Action Monitoring
Ongoing monitoring for anomalous agent behaviour once deployed.
- Anomalous-action detection
- Escalation on unusual chains
- Feeds SIRI MDR
Evidence, not guesswork
No agentic testing vs. standard AI security vs. SIRI Agentic Security — what actually differs
Testing a model's outputs and testing an agent's actions are different disciplines.
| Approach | No agentic testing | Standard AI/LLM security testing | SIRI Agentic Security |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive-agency & permission testing | No | Rare | Included |
| Tool & plugin misuse testing | No | Rare | Included |
| Indirect prompt-injection testing | No | Sometimes | Included |
| Multi-step action-chaining testing | No | No | Included |
| Mapped to OWASP LLM Top 10 | No | Partially | Yes |
Sources: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025); NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Summarised for comparison.
Numbers every board should know
What the agentic adoption gap looks like
Have AI in production
Of organisations, a growing share of it agentic or tool-connected.
Have formal AI testing
Of those organisations — most not scoped for agentic-specific risk.
Named OWASP category
Excessive Agency is formally recognised in the OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025).
Had an AI-related incident
Of enterprises report at least one AI-related security incident to date.
Compliance alignment
Standards & frameworks we align to
Our methodology is built around publicly recognised frameworks — not a proprietary checklist. Where a specific certification or attestation is completed and verified, it will be named here explicitly.
Framework references reflect publicly available versions as of publication and describe the standards our methodology is aligned to; they are not a claim of certification, attestation, or audit completion unless stated explicitly elsewhere on this site.
Why SIRI for agentic security specifically
Testing built for systems that act, not just systems that answer
Agentic security is a distinct discipline from conventional AppSec and even from standard LLM testing.
Built for emerging technology
Autonomous and agentic systems are core to how SIRI is built, not an afterthought bolted onto conventional AppSec.
Tests actions, not just outputs
Testing covers what an agent can be manipulated into doing, not only what it can be manipulated into saying.
Mapped to current frameworks
Findings map to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, specifically the Excessive Agency category, and the NIST AI RMF.
Connected to the rest of SIRI Security
Findings escalate into SIRI AI Security for model-layer issues, SIRI Attack for infrastructure, and SIRI MDR for ongoing monitoring.
Who this is built for
Organisations SIRI's agentic security is built for
How we work
From mapping agent actions to continuous monitoring
Map Agent Actions
Inventorying every tool, plugin and action an agent can take.
Week 1Adversarial Testing
Testing excessive agency, indirect injection and action chaining.
Weeks 2–3Harden Guardrails
Constraint and policy recommendations mapped to findings.
Week 4Continuous Monitoring
Ongoing monitoring for anomalous agent behaviour post-deployment.
OngoingFrequently asked
Agentic security, answered directly
How is this different from SIRI AI Security?
SIRI AI Security covers the full AI pipeline including models and RAG; agentic security is a specific, deeper focus on autonomous action-taking — permissions, tool use and multi-step chaining — for agents that don't just generate output but act on it.
What frameworks do you use to build agents ourselves, or only test existing ones?
Both — agentic security engagements can inform architecture and guardrail design before launch, or test an already-deployed agent.
Can an agent really be manipulated without direct access to its prompt?
Yes — indirect prompt injection through a document, webpage, email or tool output the agent processes can influence its behaviour without an attacker ever touching the system prompt directly.
What's the most common finding in an agentic security assessment?
Excessive agency — permissions or tool access broader than a given task actually requires — is consistently among the most common and highest-impact findings.
Do you test multi-agent systems, where several agents coordinate?
Yes, where scoped — multi-agent orchestration introduces additional risk from how agents trust and act on each other's outputs, which is tested as part of action-chaining assessment.
Find out what your agent can be talked into
Test the actions, not just the answers.
Start with a scoped assessment of one agent, or map your full agentic footprint first.
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